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U.S. Government Assessment of the Syrian Government’s Use of Chemical Weapons on August 21, 2013 : ウィキペディア英語版 | U.S. Government Assessment of the Syrian Government’s Use of Chemical Weapons on August 21, 2013 The U.S. Government Assessment of the Syrian Government's Use of Chemical Weapons on August 21, 2013 was a report published by the United States Government on the Ghouta chemical attack on August 21, 2013. The 4-page assessment was published on August 30, and a 12-page classified version made available for members of Congress.〔 The report declared that "The United States Government assesses with high confidence that the Syrian government carried out a chemical weapons attack in the Damascus suburbs on August 21, 2013. We further assess that the regime used a nerve agent in the attack."〔 The report relied upon the purported transcript of an intercepted phone call within the Syrian Defense Ministry and Army. The contents of the call and their meaning are contested by some elected officials in the United States, and by some United States intelligence and media sources. ==Preparation== Intelligence reports are normally released by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and labelled an "intelligence assessment". This report was described as a "Government Assessment" and the unclassified version was released by the White House Press Secretary. Inter Press Service's attempts to clarify with the Office why this report had been released by the White House Press Secretary were met with stonewalling.〔 One former intelligence official later told Inter Press Service that the description as a 'Government Assessment' rather than an 'intelligence assessment' "means that this is not an intelligence community document"; another said that the White House had apparently "decided on a position and cherry-picked the intelligence to fit it".〔Gareth Porter, 9 September 2013, Inter Press Service, (/CORRECTED REPEAT/Obama’s Case for Syria Didn’t Reflect Intel Consensus )〕 A 29 August report from the Associated Press, citing "two intelligence officials and two more U.S. officials", said that "The quest for added intelligence to bolster the White House's case for a strike against Assad's military infrastructure was the issue that delayed the release of the U.S. intelligence community's report, which had been expected Tuesday (August )".〔Kimberly Dozier and Matt Apuzzo, Associated Press, 29 August 2013, (AP sources: Intelligence on weapons no 'slam dunk' )〕 Citing the same sources, it described the unpublished report as being "A report by the Office of the Director for National Intelligence outlining () evidence against Syria" and said that it "include() a few key caveats — including acknowledging that the U.S. intelligence community no longer has the certainty it did six months ago of where the regime's chemical weapons are stored, nor does it have proof Assad ordered chemical weapons use".〔 Former CIA officer Philip Giraldi later wrote that "With all evidence considered, the intelligence community found itself with numerous skeptics in the ranks, leading to sharp exchanges with the Director of Central Intelligence John Brennan and Director of National Intelligence James Clapper. A number of analysts threatened to resign as a group if their strong dissent was not noted in any report released to the public, forcing both Brennan and Clapper to back down."〔Philip Giraldi, ''The American Conservative'', 13 November 2013, (Quitting Over Syria )〕
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